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SPECIAL FEATURES
IS THE NCAA PROHIBITION OF NATIVE AMERICAN
MASCOTS FROM CHAMPIONSHIP PLAY A VIOLATION OF
THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT?
Ryan Fulda*
Introduction
Tens of thousands of fans scream as Chief Osceola rides his horse onto the
football field at Florida State University.' With his "flaming spear" in hand,
the school mascot leads university fans in cheers before the football game
begins.2 At a season-opening football game at the University of Illinois, Chief
Illiniwek, a school mascot wearing a costume actually made by Native
Americans, performs his "fancy dance," a tradition over three-quarters of a
century old.3 What both of these traditions have in common is that they
involve Native American symbolism and imagery. They differ, however, in
the significant point that as of August 1, 2008,' only the Florida State Mascot
will be permitted to perform at post-season events sponsored by the National
Collegiate Athletic Association.5 After this date, the University of Illinois will
not be allowed to display Chief Illiniwek at NCAA-sponsored post-season
events; the university will either have to leave the Chief at home, or choose not
to participate in the event at all.6
* J.D., 2006, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. Daryl Fears, Indian Mascots: Pride or Prejudice? Even Tribes Are Divided as NCAA
Issues Edict, WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 14, 2005, at A3.
2. Id.
3. Louis B. Garippo, The Chief Illiniwek Dialogue: Intent and Tradition vs. Reaction and
History: A Report to the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois pt. IV(D) (2000),
available at http://www.uillinois.edu/trustees/dialogue/report files/toc.html.
4. Press Release, NCAA, NCAA Executive Committee Issues Guidelines for Use of
Native American Mascots at Championship Events (Aug. 5, 2005), available at
http://www2.ncaa.org/media-and events/pressroom/2005/august/20050805_execcommrls.
html [hereinafter Press Release, NCAA Guidelines].
5. Press Release, NCAA, Statement byNCAA Senior Vice-President for Governance and
Membership Bernard Franklin on Florida State University Review (Aug. 23, 2005), available
at http://www2.ncaa.org/media-and-events/press-room/2005/August/20050823_franklinstmt
appeal.html [hereinafter Press Release, NCAA Statement].
6. See Press Release, NCAA Guidelines, supra note 4.
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For better, or for worse, this note will not focus on the moral and ethical
implications of the collegiate use of Native American imagery. Instead, this
note will focus on whether the NCAA's prohibition of Native American
mascots and images (hereinafter referred to as the "NCAA mascot ban") from
NCAA-sponsored championship play violates section one of the Sherman Act.
This paper will demonstrate how a controversial issue implicates a sometimes
over-looked area of the law. Part I will provide the necessary background
information for an understanding of the subject matter. Part II will explain
how the Supreme Court has applied antitrust law to the NCAA. It will
examine a major Supreme Court decision, NCAA v. Board of Regents of The
University of Oklahoma,' and subsequent cases applying antitrust law to
NCAA conduct. Part III will apply antitrust law to the conduct at issue in an
effort to determine whether the NCAA regulation violates section one of the
Sherman Act. Part IV will conclude the paper with an opinion as to why the
NCAA's regulation does not violate section one of the Sherman Act.
I Background
A. An Illustrative Example
In March 2000, the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois
commissioned a senior legal professional to compile a report for the Board of
Trustees detailing the dialogue concerning Chief Illiniwek,8 the school's
seventy-four-year-old mascot.9 The non-partisan report, entitled The Chief
Illiniwek Dialogue, provided the Board of Trustees with a history of the Illini
tribe, a history of Chief Illiniwek, and a history of the controversy surrounding
the use of Chief Illiniwek as the University of Illinois mascot.'°
Beginning with the history of the Illini tribe, the report explains that "the
Illini were a loose association or confederation of several tribes all speaking
the Algonquin language. Those tribes included, among others, the Kaskaskia,
Cahokia, Peoria, Tamaroa, and Metchigamea." ' Each of these tribes was
located in a region near the Illinois-Wisconsin border.' The report goes on to
7. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
8. Garippo, supra note 3, at pt. I.
9. Id. at pt. II.
10. See Garippo, supra note 3.





explain how the United States Government's policy of removal forced the
Illini Southwest, until they finally settled in Oklahoma. 3
The report also outlined the history of the University of Illinois mascot,
Chief Illiniwek. The tradition began in 1926, when Ray Dvorak, assistant
band director, "conceived the idea of having a Native American war dance
performed at halftime at the Illinois-Pennsylvania [football] game."' 4 The
report describes Lester Leutwiler, the first student to portray Chief Illiniwek:
Leutwiler, a student with a keen interest in native lore, was picked
to dance. Relying on knowledge gained as an Eagle Scout, he
prepared a homemade costume complete with a war bonnet made
of turkey feathers. The halftime performance was a big hit. For the
rest of the 1926 season and again for the 1927 season, Leutwiler
continued his Chief performances. 5
The report also provides the source of inspiration for the name "Chief
Illiniwek:"
The expression "Illiniwek" was first used in conjunction with the
University of Illinois by football coach Bob Zuppke in the mid
1920's. Zup was a philosopher and historian by training and
inclination, and he was intrigued by the concept the Illini peoples
held about their identity and aspirations. They spoke a dialect of the
Algonquin language and used the term "Illiniwek" to refer to the
complete human being - the strong, agile human body; the
unfettered human intellect; the indomitable human spirit.' 6
The University of Illinois continued to use Chief Illiniwek for the
1929 football season.
17
By 1930, the Chief Illiniwek character had gained so much support that A.
Webber Borchers, the student who portrayed Chief Illiniwek at the time, took
the initiative to visit the Pine Ridge Reservation in Kadota, South Dakota, in
an attempt to obtain an authentic mascot costume.' 8 The report cites Borchers'
recollection of his meeting with Mr. W.W. Jermark, the Superintendent of
Indian Affairs at the Pine Ridge Reservation: "[Jermark] called in an old
13. Id.




18. Id. at pt. IV(B).
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Indian woman and explained to her what I wanted. I wanted the war suit to be
made in the old original way. She agreed to undertake the project."' 9
The current Chief Illiniwek costume "was sewn by the wife of Frank Fools
Crow, the elderly chief of the Ogala Sioux tribe of South Dakota."'2 Fool's
Crow presented the outfit to the university in 1982 "at halftime of a football
game, after having been flown in from South Dakota on.the private plane of
a local businessman.'
Chief Illiniwek has played a prominent role in University of Illinois
tradition. In 1957, Chief Illiniwek participated in the second inauguration of
President Dwight D. Eisenhower.2 The University of Illinois has interwoven
the Chief theme into academic and alumni matters, and the Chief logo
appeared on all sorts of university memorabilia. 23 Despite the prominent role
the Chief played in each of these areas, the report notes that "a serious
controversy regarding the Chief began in 1989," and since that time
"appearances of the Chief have been curtailed gradually. 24 "Currently he only
performs at football, basketball, and volleyball games." '2
In 1995, in response to the growing controversy surrounding the University
of Illinois' use of Chief Illiniwek, "the Peoria Tribe, direct descendants of the
Illini tribe, approved the use of Chief Illiniwek by the University. '26 The tribe
released a statement explaining:
To say that we are anything but proud to have these portrayals
would be completely wrong. We're proud that the University of
Illinois is the major institution in the state, a state of learning, and
they are drawing on that background of our having been there.
And what more honor could they pay us?
27
At this time, the Peoria tribe seemingly expressed enthusiastic and
unconditional support for Chief Illiniwek. Five years later, however, the Peoria













resolution by a vote of 3 to 2 requesting that the University cease the use of
Chief Illiniwek."
28
The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois has not followed the
Peoria Tribe's request.29 In 2005, the NCAA adopted a policy that will require
the University of Illinois to either abstain from NCAA post-season play, or
remove the Native American references during NCAA sponsored events."
The preceding story of the University of Illinois is in some ways typical of
the growing controversy in the last quarter century surrounding the use of
Native American mascots and symbols by universities. Proponents of the
NCAA regulation have argued that the use of Native American imagery and
symbols in college sports is a "mockery not only of Indian customs but also
of white people's culture," reasoning that the inappropriate use of Native
American imagery "degrades the Indian and disgraces the white race by
revealing an ignorance of tribal cultures."'" In an attempt to place the imagery
in context, one critic explained, "The Illiniwek exhibition is tantamount to
someone putting on a parody of a Catholic Mass."32 Despite the outspoken
proponents of the NCAA regulation, opponents contend that the various
university traditions honor Native Americans by portraying them in a brave
and courageous light, "as they would want to be portrayed. 33
This growing controversy prompted the NCAA to take action in August of
2005 -- passing a resolution that prohibited "NCAA colleges and universities
from displaying hostile and abusive racial/ethnic/national origin mascots,
nicknames or imagery at any of the 88 NCAA Championships."34
B. NCAA Background
The NCAA began in 1905," 5 and it is currently an association of 1024
colleges and universities, 36 and in 2001 included over 355,000 men and
women participating in intercollegiate athletics.37 These active member
28. Id.
29. See Press Release, NCAA Guidelines, supra note 4.
30. Id.
31. Garippo, supra note 3, at pt. V.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Press Release, NCAA Guidelines, supra note 4.
35. NCAA.org, History ofthe NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/history.html (last visited
Oct. 17, 2006).
36. NCAA.org, About the NCAA: Membership, http://www2.ncaa.org/portal/about_ncaa/
membership/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
37. NCAA, Fact Sheet (Mar. 4,2002), available athttp://www.ncaa.org/about/factsheet.
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006
AMERICAN INDIAN LA WREVIEW
schools are divided into three different categories: Division I, Division II, and
Division 11J.38 The NCAA's website provides this brief overview of the
organization: "The 1,024 active member schools self-determine which of three
divisions they will be classified in and must annually meet membership criteria
for that division. The active member institutions and voting conferences are
the ultimate voice in all Association decisions., 39  One of the NCAA's basic
purposes is: "To initiate, stimulate and improve intercollegiate athletics
programs for student-athletes and to promote and develop educational
leadership, physical fitness, athletics excellence and athletics participation as
a recreational pursuit."4 The NCAA describes its "Core Values" as follows:
The Association - through its member institutions, conferences and
national office staff - shares a belief in and commitment to:
>> The collegiate model of athletics in which students participate
as an avocation, balancing their academic, social and athletics
experiences.
>> The highest levels of integrity and sportsmanship.
>> The pursuit of excellence in both academics and athletics.
>> The supporting role that intercollegiate athletics plays in the
higher education mission and in enhancing the sense of
community and strengthening the identity of member
institutions.
>> An inclusive culture that fosters equitable participation for
student-athletes and career opportunities for coaches and
administrators from diverse backgrounds.
>> Respect for institutional autonomy and philosophical
differences.
pdf.
38. NCAA, NCAA Division 1, 11 and III Membership Criteria, http://www.ncaa.org/about/
div_criteria.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2006). The main distinguishing characteristic of each
division is that Division I schools have more teams that compete in varsity sports than Division
II teams, and Division II schools have more competing varsity teams than Division III schools.
39. Id.
40. NCAA, 2005-2006 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL: CONSTITUTION, OPERATING BYLAwS,
ADMINISTRATIVE BYLAwS 1 (2005), available at http://www.ncaa.org/library/membership/




>> Presidential leadership of intercollegiate athletics at the
campus, conference and national levels."'
The NCAA's purpose and goals are not directly related to economics;
however, the economic consequences ofNCAA regulations cannot be ignored.
Take, for example, Division I-A schools, the highest revenue producing
division in the NCAA.a2 In 2003, the average revenue derived from college
athletics for Division I-A schools was $29.4 million, and average expenses
were $27.2 million.43 The most lucrative athletic department took in revenues
of $87.8 million." These same schools had an average of 324 participating
male student athletes and spent an average of $39,000 per male athlete in
2003.41 In addition, twenty-five percent of Division I-A schools lost money
and were unable to turn a profit. 6 A report by Sports Illustrated also reveals
the economic implications of college athletics.47 The report details revenues
for major college sports conferences. According to the report, in 2000, the
Southeastern Conference had total revenue of over $94 million, while the Big
12 had total revenue of over $85 million.48
As the above figures indicate, economics permeate college athletics,
affecting areas including ticket sales, merchandising, television contracts,
alumni fundraising, sponsorship agreements, and providing scholarships for
student athletes. Many of the aforementioned are inextricably tied to an
athletic department's ability to market its program. Therefore, it is
understandable that an NCAA regulation that directly affects a university's
ability to market its product may have a direct or indirect effect upon the
revenue a university derives from its athletic department.
Throughout its existence, the NCAA "has adopted and promulgated playing
rules, standards of amateurism, standards for academic eligibility, regulations
concerning recruitment of athletes, and rules governing the size of athletic
41. NCAA, Core Values for NCAA, http://www2.ncaa.org/aboutncaa/overview/mission.
html (last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
42. DANIEL L. FULKS, NCAA, 2002-2003 NCAA REVENUES AND EXPENSES OF DIVISIONS
I AND II INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS PROGRAMS REPORT 23 (2005), available at http://www
.ncaa.org/library/research/i-ii-rev-exp/2003/2002-03dl d2revexp.pdf.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 24.
45. Id. at 19.
46. See id. at 25.
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coaching staffs." 49 In each of these instances the NCAA has promulgated rules
necessary for the existence of a product -- college athletics. During its life,
however, the NCAA has also wandered out of bounds and imposed regulations
not necessary for the existence of its product and unrelated to its purpose.50 In
1984, the Supreme Court found the NCAA in violation of the Sherman Act for
placing output and price limitations on television contracts.5  This
demonstrates an important point: many NCAA regulations are legally valid
and necessary for a product to exist, but nevertheless, the NCAA is not beyond
the law and can violate the Sherman Act.
C. Background of NCAA Regulation Prohibiting the Use of Native
American Mascots in Post-Season Play
A skimming of the almost 500-page 2005-2006 NCAA Division I Manual
reveals the breadth and diversity of the regulations that the NCAA imposes
upon its member institutions. 2  These regulations include academic
requirements for college athletes, financial aid, rules regulating playing and
practice seasons, procedures for drug testing, guidelines for team uniforms,
and literally thousands of other regulations.5 3
On August 5, 2005, the NCAA "adopted a new policy to prohibit NCAA
colleges and universities from displaying hostile and abusive
racial/ethnic/national origin mascots, nicknames or imagery at any of the 88
NCAA Championships." 4 At the time, the mandate essentially prohibited
eighteen NCAA teams from hosting any NCAA championship event, effective
as of February 1, 2006.55 It also prohibited those same teams from wearing
material with such hostile or abusive references at any NCAA championship,
effective August 1, 2008.56 The NCAA press statement went on to explain,
"[The NCAA believes] that mascots, nicknames or images deemed hostile or
49. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 88 (1984).
50. Id. at 120 (finding the NCAA television contract plan violated section one of Sherman
Act).
51. Id. at 113, 120.
52. See generally NCAA DMSION I MANUAL, supra note 40.
53. Id. Article 14 is titled, "Eligibility: Academic and General Requirements"; Article 15
is titled "Financial Aid"; Article 17 is titled "Playing and Practice Season"; Article 30.5 is titled
"Drug Testing Program".






abusive in terms of race, ethnicity or national origin should not be visible at
the championship events that we control." '
In addition to banning the listed teams from participating in championship
play, the press statement went on to encourage all NCAA members to adopt
policies discouraging the use of offensive Native American symbols: "Model
institutions include the University of Iowa and University of Wisconsin, who
have practices of not scheduling athletic competitions with schools who use
Native American nicknames, imagery or mascots." 8 The statement stressed
that "institutions affected by the new policy can seek further review of the
matter through the NCAA governing structure."5 9
Fourteen days later, the NCAA Executive Committee released a press
statement outlining the appeal process for universities to seek approval of their
use of Native American mascots, names and imagery at NCAA
championships.6° The statement explained that appeals would be handled on
a case-by-case basis and would consider "the unique aspects and
circumstances as it relates to the specific use and practice at that college or
university."' It emphasized: "One primary factor that will be considered in
the review is if documentation exists that a 'namesake' tribe has formally
approved of the use of the mascot, name and imagery by the institution. ' 6
In the weeks following the implementation of these new guidelines, Florida
State, Central Michigan, and Utah were each granted exemptions from the
regulation.63 In each case, the NCAA Executive Committee noted the
relationship between the university and the affected tribes, describing these
relationships as a "significant factor" in making the decision to exempt the




60. Press Release, NCAA, NCAA Executive Comm. Approves Native American Mascot




63. Press Release, NCAA Statement, supra note 5; Press Release, NCAA, Statement by
NCAA Senior Vice-President for Governance and Membership Bernard Franklin on Central
Michigan and University of Utah Reviews (Sept. 2, 2005), http://www2.ncaa.org/media_
andevents/press_room/2005/september/20050902_cmuutah_franklinstmnt.html [hereinafter
Press Release, Statement by NCAA Senior Vice-President].
64. Press Release, NCAA Statement, supra note 5; Press Release, Statement by NCAA
Senior Vice-President, supra note 63.
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006
172 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31
In contrast, during this same time period, the NCAA Executive Committee
"retained the University of North Dakota on the list of colleges and
universities subject to restrictions on the use of Native American mascots,
names and imagery at NCAA championships." 5 In the press release outlining
this decision, the NCAA explained: "Information the NCAA received from the
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe clearly
indicates both tribes oppose the university's use of the 'Fighting Sioux'
nickname and imagery." The Committee went on to explain, "The decision
of a namesake sovereign tribe, regarding when and how its name and imagery
can be used, must be respected even when others may not agree.'6 7
The NCAA also retained the University of Illinois, Champaign, on the list,
citing in a press release that it "found no new information relative to the
mascot known as 'Chief Illiniwek' or the logo mark used by some athletics
teams that depicts a Native American in feathered headdress, to remove the
university from the list."'" The press release went on to explain:
The staff review committee found that over the last decade, the
volume and frequency of contentiousness around Chief Illiniwek
has increased. Those who oppose continued use of Chief Illiniwek
have grown in number and have found national platforms for their
argument that the broad range of Native Americans perceive the
Chief s "fancy dance" a demeaning interpretation of their own
customs and traditions.69
The press release concluded with a reminder that, the university could file an
appeal with the NCAA Executive Committee.70
65. Press Release, NCAA, Statement byNCAA Senior Vice-President for Governance and





68. Press Release, NCAA, Statement by NCAA Senior Vice-President for Governance and
Membership Bernard Franklin on University of Illinois, Champaign Review (Nov. 11, 2005),






D. Background of Antitrust Law
Section one of the Sherman Act reads: "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."'"
The first prima facie element of section one is simple: a contract,
combination, or conspiracy - some form of an agreement. The second prima
facie element is more problematic: an agreement in restraint of trade. The
difficulty in applying this element lies in the word "restraint." As Justice
Harlan noted in his partial concurrence in Standard Oil Co. v. United States:
"Is it confined to a contract or combination which is only in unreasonable
restraint of trade or commerce, or does it include what the language of the act
plainly and in terms covers,-all contracts of that nature?"" The Supreme Court
also addressed the issue in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States: "Every
agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to
restrain, is of their very essence., 73 In both of these instances, the Court was
pointing out that, when read literally, every commercial agreement in some
way restrains trade. For example, by selling goods to Acme, the seller is
restrained from selling those identical goods to another buyer. In light of this
absurd literal translation, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Sherman Act
to prohibit only "unreasonable" restraints of trade.74
Around this time, the Supreme Court also began to apply the "rule of
reason" as a method of analyzing conduct. In early cases the rule of reason
was applied inconsistently. However, the general test was "whether the
restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition. 75 More recently, the Supreme Court described the test in State
Oil Co. v. Khan:
[M]ost antitrust claims are analyzed under a "rule of reason,"
according to which the finder of fact must decide whether the
questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on
competition, taking into account a variety of factors, including
specific information about the relevant business, its condition
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
72. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,87 (1912) (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
73. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
74. See STEPHEN F. Ross, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW 127 (1993).
75. Id. at 123-25.
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before and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint's
history, nature, and effect.76
After developing the rule of reason, the Supreme Court set about "creating
a category of restraints so likely to suppress competition that they can be
condemned without full consideration of their history, purpose, and effect (the
so-called 'per se' rule)."" Under the per se rule, however, "[t]he plaintiff need
only prove that the practice occurred and is not required to affirmatively
demonstrate its competitive unreasonableness, while the defendants are
precluded from attempting to justify the restraint as being reasonable." ' In
comparing the two approaches, it is important to note that a plaintiff would
rather the court apply the per se rule because the elements will be easier to
show. A defendant, however, would rather the court apply the rule of reason
because the plaintiff will then have to show an "unreasonable restraint on
competition."79
II. Antitrust Law as Applied to the NCAA
The NCAA is an anomaly of antitrust law because courts will rarely find it
permissible for competitors to join together and regulate competition with one
another.8" Nevertheless, in NCAA v. Board of Regents, the Supreme Court did




In Board of Regents, the University of Oklahoma and the University of
Georgia sued the NCAA, alleging that the NCAA's conduct violated section
one of the Sherman Act.8" The conduct at issue was a television licensing
agreement between the NCAA and two major television channels lasting from
1981 through 1985.83 The central part of the agreement, and the part to which
Oklahoma and Georgia objected, was that it regulated price and output of "all
forms of television of the football games of NCAA member institutions."'
8
The NCAA regulation provided the two television channels with the
76. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (citing Ariz. v. Maricopa Co. Med. Soc'y,
457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982)).
77. Ross, supra note 74, at 127-28.
78. WILuAM C. HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 2.9 (1994).
79. State Oil, 522 U.S. at 10.
80. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 99-100 (1984).
81. Id. at 101.
82. Id. at 88.




alternating right to "submit a bid at an essentially fixed price to the institutions
involved."85
The NCAA television licensing agreement had the practical effect of setting
the price that the television channel paid to the member institutions. 86 "A fee
of $600,000 was paid for each of the 12 national games telecast by ABC
during the regular fall season and $426,779 was paid for each of the 46
regional telecasts in 1980. ' ' 8' The plan also contained "appearance
requirements" and "appearance limitations" requiring that each of the two
networks schedule appearances for at least eighty-two different member
institutions during a two-year period.18 The plan "[limited] the total amount
of televised intercollegiate football and the number of games that any one team
may televise. No member [was] permitted to make any sale of television
rights except in accordance with the basic plan.
89
The Supreme Court held that the NCAA's television licensing agreement
violated section one of the Sherman Act.90 The Court found, "The NCAA
television plan on its face constitutes a restraint upon the operation of a free
market, and the findings of the District Court establish that it has operated to
raise prices and reduce output."9' The Court explained that the Sherman Act
rule of reason analysis "place[s] upon petitioner a heavy burden of establishing
an affirmative defense which competitively justifies this apparent deviation
from the operations of a free market., 92 The district court had concluded the
restraint was not necessary to market product, that the contract was
unresponsive to consumer preferences, and that the restraint limited price and
output without any pro-competitivejustifications. 9 The Supreme Court further
remarked, "A restraint that has the effect of reducing the importance of
consumer preference in setting price and output is not consistent with [the]
fundamental goal of antitrust law." 94
The practical result of Board ofRegents is that the Court applied the rule of
reason to conduct - a price fixing and output restriction - that it would
normally find per se unreasonable. The Court applied the rule of reason
85. Id. at 93.
86. Id. at 106 n.30.
87. Id. at 93 n.10.
88. Id. at 94.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 120.
91. Id. at 113.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 106-07.
94. Id. at 107.
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instead of the per se approach because it found that the agreement was
necessary, explaining, "Our decision not to apply aper se rule to this case rests
in large part on our recognition that a certain degree of cooperation is
necessary if the type of competition that petitioner and its member institutions
seek to market is to be preserved." '
Following Board of Regents, other NCAA conduct has been examined for
violating the Sherman Act. In several instances, courts have been presented
with the issue of whether NCAA student athlete eligibility requirements
violate section one of the Sherman Act. In each of these cases the courts have
found that the eligibility requirements do not violate the Sherman Act.96
In Banks v. NCAA, University of Notre Dame college football player
Braxston Banks previously declared himself eligible for the NFL draft. 97 The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana opinion
explains: "By placing his name in the 1990 NFL draft, Mr. Banks lost his
amateur status for football and, hence, became ineligible to play intercollegiate
football by virtue of NCAA Bylaw 12.2.4, the 'no-draft' rule." 98 After Banks
was not selected in the draft, nor picked up as a free agent, he petitioned the
NCAA to be allowed to re-enter college football and use his one remaining
year of eligibility.99 The NCAA denied this request because the "NCAA rules
deem a person who has [entered the NFL draft and hired an agent] a
professional and ineligible to play amateur intercollegiate football."' ° Banks
then sought "injunctive relief against the [NCAA] and the University of Notre
Dame to restore his eligibility to play intercollegiate football for Notre Dame
during the 1990 season."'' Banks argued that the NCAA eligibility rule was
an unreasonable restraint of trade and violated section one of the Sherman
95. Id. at 117.
96. Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998) (rejecting student athlete's argument that
NCAA bylaw prohibiting her from participating in sports while a graduate student at a different
institution than that which she attended for her undergraduate studies was a violation of the
Sherman Act); see also Banks v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp 850 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (rejecting former
college football player's argument that NCAA eligibility guidelines prohibiting player from
participating in college sports after declaring for draft violates section one of Sherman Act); see
also Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (finding NCAA eligibility rule that
prohibited player who had entered National Football League draft from reentering college
football was not subject to antitrust analysis).
97. See Banks, 746 F. Supp. at 851.
98. Id. at 853.
99. Id. at 854-55.





Act.'0 2 The district court rejected Banks' argument because the NCAA policy
did not violate antitrust laws. 3
The NCAA has articulated procompetitive effects of its 'no-draft'
rule. NCAA regulations are designed to preserve amateurism and
to prevent the professionalization of college sports to the extent
educational objectives would be overshadowed. If college football
players could shuttle between the professional draft and their
college teams, the NCAA argues, the players' profit-making
objectives soon would overshadow educational objectives, blur the
line between college and professional football, and create a number
of potential problems for the effective management of teams
engaged in college football."
In Gaines v. NCAA, the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Tennessee also considered the issue of whether the NCAA "no-draft" rule
violates the Sherman Act.' The facts in Gaines are similar to those in Banks.
Gaines chose to forego his final year of college football and entered the draft
for the National Football League.' 6 When Gaines was not picked up by an
NFL team, he sought an injunction requiring the NCAA to allow him to
participate in the 1990-1991 college football season.'0 7 Gaines argued that the
NCAA, "by preventing college football players like himself from returning to
college play for which they are otherwise eligible after an unsuccessful bid in
the NFL draft, have engaged in an unlawful exercise of monopoly power in
violation of 15 U.S.C § 2.'' While the court in Gaines only addressed a
section two claim, the court's rationale is informative as to how other courts
may apply antitrust law to NCAA conduct. The court emphasized this
important distinction: "[There] is a clear difference between the NCAA's
efforts to restrict the televising of college football games and the NCAA's
efforts to maintain a discernible line between amateurism and professionalism
and protect the amateur objectives of NCAA college football by enforcing the
eligibility rules."' 9 The Gaines court later cited the Banks opinion with
approval, explaining: "This court agrees with the findings of the Banks court
102. Id.
103. Id. at 863.
104. Id. at 860-61.
105. Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 741 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
106. Id. at 740.
107. Id. at 741.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 746.
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that the 'no-agent' and 'no-draft' Rules have primarily procompetitive effects
in that they promote the integrity and quality of college football and preserve
the distinct 'product' of major college football as an amateur sport."
' 10
The Gaines court also noted that while the Supreme Court has not held that
NCAA eligibility requirements are not subject to antitrust scrutiny, "it [has]
cited a case with approval ... which stated exactly that.""' This fact, along
with the Banks and Gaines opinions, suggests that most courts will find that
NCAA eligibility rules such as "no-draft" and "no-agent" regulations do not
violate section one of the Sherman Act. However, these cases have somewhat
limited application to the NCAA's mascot ban because this prohibition does
not deal with the eligibility of student athletes. Other cases may offer better
insight as to how a court would examine the NCAA mascot regulation.
In Adidas v. NCAA, the U.S. District Court of Kansas examined whether an
NCAA bylaw regulating team uniforms violated section one of the Sherman
Act.' 2 College uniform manufacturer Adidas objected to an NCAA regulation
that stated: "a student-athlete's uniform and other items of apparel "shall bear
only a single manufacturer's or distributor's normal label or trademark..., not
,,113to exceed 2 1/4 square inches in area ....
The court explained that before determining whether to apply theper se rule
or the rule of reason, "the court must first determine the threshold issue of
whether Bylaw 12.5.5 is properly the subject of antitrust law.""' 4 The court
pointed out, "a number of federal circuit courts have recognized that the
noncommercial activities of certain organizations are outside the scope of the
antitrust laws.""' 5 The court then explained, "To determine whether Bylaw
12.5.5 is commercial, the court must look to the underlying purposes of the
bylaw, the NCAA's reasons for creating the advertising regulation, and
whether the bylaw confers a direct economic benefit on the NCAA. ' '" 6 Below
is the analysis of the NCAA's purpose for enacting Bylaw 12.5.5.
First, Bylaw 12.5.5 is designed to accomplish the NCAA's
principle of maintaining amateurism by protecting student-athletes
from commercial exploitation. Second, Bylaw 12.5.5 attempts to
110. Id.
111. Id. at 743 (citations omitted) (referring to Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1975)).
112. Adidas v. NCAA, 40 F. Supp. 2d 1275 (D. Kan. 1999).
113. Id. at 1285.
114. Id. at 1283.
115. Id.




preserve the integrity and uniqueness of intercollegiate sports by
preventing member schools from turning their student-athletes into
billboards in the pursuit of advertising revenues. Third, the bylaw
is designed to avoid excessive advertising that could potentially
interfere with the basic function of the student-athletes' uniforms,
which is to provide immediate identification of the athlete's
number and team to his or her teammates and to the referee or
umpire officiating the contest. Th.re is no evidence before the
court to suggest that the purpose of Bylaw 12.5.5 is to provide the
NCAA or its member institutions with any commercial or
economic advantage. The court concludes that Bylaw 12.5.5 has
noncommercial purposes and objectives." 7
After finding the bylaw noncommercial in nature, the court went on to
"determine if the contested activity, despite its noncommercial nature and
purposes, is objectively noncompetitive."' 8 The court inquired into "whether
the NCAA or its member institutions receive a direct economic or competitive
benefit from the enforcement of Bylaw 12.5.5.""9 The court reasoned: "[T]he
NCAA and its member institutions are not competitors of Adidas and do not
realize any financial or competitive advantage by limiting the amount of
advertising allowed on the backs of student-athletes.' 2 ° It concluded by
saying: "Bylaw 12.5.5 is noncommercial in nature and purpose, and that the
NCAA's enforcement of the bylaw is a noncommercial activity not subject to
the antitrust laws. Adidas, therefore, has failed to show a likelihood of success
on the merits of its antitrust claims.'
' 2'
As these cases indicate, several courts have examined NCAA conduct and
found that it does not violate section one of the Sherman Act. However, there
is one case in addition to Board of Regents in which a court has found that an
NCAA regulation violates section one of the Sherman Act. This case was Law
v. NCAA.
22
In Law, a group of collegiate assistant basketball coaches sought an
injunction to prohibit the NCAA from enforcing a "rule limiting annual
compensation of certain Division I entry-level coaches to $16,000.,A 2' This




121. Id. at 1287.
122. Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1012 (10th Cir. 1998).
123. Id.
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rule was commonly referred to as the "REC Rule," or restricted-eamings coach
rule.'24  The plaintiffs, restricted-earnings men's basketball coaches,
"challenged the REC Rule's limitation on compensation under section one of
the Sherman Antitrust Act as an unlawful 'contract, combination ...or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade."1
25
The court chose not to apply the rule of reason or the per se approach to the
conduct, but instead adopted "a 'quick look' rule of reason."'' 6 The court
explained the unique aspects of the quick look rule:
Under a quick look rule of reason analysis, anticompetitive effect
is established, even without a determination of the relevant market,
where the plaintiff shows that a horizontal agreement to fix prices
exists, that the agreement is effective, and that the price set by such
an agreement is more favorable to the defendant than otherwise
would have resulted from the operation of market forces.
127
Applying this "quick look" analysis to the case, the court concluded:
In our analysis, the plaintiff only has the burden of establishing the
anticompetitive effect of the restraint at issue. Once the plaintiff
meets that burden, which the coaches have done in this case by
showing the naked and effective price-fixing character of the
agreement, the burden shifts to the defendant to justify the restraint
as a "reasonable" one.
128
The court then concluded that the defendant's propounded reasons for the
restraint (retention of entry-level positions, cost reduction, maintaining
competition) were not enough to justify the price-fixing arrangement as
reasonable.
2 9
The above cases provide various examples of courts applying antitrust law
to NCAA conduct. The analysis used by these courts is useful in trying to
determine whether a court would find that the NCAA mascot-ban violates
section one of the Sherman Act.
124. Id. at 1014.
125. Id. at 1015 (citations omitted).
126. Id. at 1020.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1021.
129. Id. at 1024 (affirming the district court's order "granting a permanent injunction barring




11. Application ofAntitrust Law to the Mascot-Ban
It is impossible to know exactly how a court would apply antitrust law to
the NCAA mascot-ban, but the mentioned cases do provide valuable insight
into what a court's analysis would likely involve.
A. Is the NCAA Mascot-Ban Subject to the Sherman Act?
Like the Adidas court, a court might first consider whether the NCAA
mascot-ban is "properly the subject of antitrust law."' 3 The court would
probably ask the same questions the court in Adidas asked: Is the bylaw
commercial? What was "the NCAA's reason for creating the advertising
regulation?" Does "the bylaw [confer] a direct economic benefit on the
NCAA[?]'
13 1
In a press release concerning the mascot ban, the NCAA commented on its
purpose for adopting the policy. "[A]s a national association, we believe that
mascots, nicknames or images deemed hostile or abusive in terms of race,
ethnicity or national origin should not be visible at the championship events
that we control.' ' 132 The press release goes on to explain three significant
factors that prompted the association's decision to regulate the use of Native
American mascots: "membership feedback; ongoing issues surrounding the
Confederate Battle Flag; and the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights' statement
on the use of American Indian imagery as sports symbols."'
33
According to the Adidas analysis, even if a court were to conclude that the
NCAA regulation is noncommercial, the court could still search to "determine
if the contested activity, despite its noncommercial nature and purposes, is
objectively noncompetitive.... [and] . .. determine whether the NCAA or its
member institutions receive a direct economic or competitive benefit from the
enforcement" of the regulation. 34 In examining these issues, a court could
conclude that the NCAA mascot ban is not properly the subject of antitrust
law. This will be a tough issue to resolve because there are reasons for and
reasons against finding that antitrust law should apply to this regulation. The
NCAA would probably argue that there is no commercial purpose for this
regulation and therefore it should not be the subject of antitrust law. However,
130. Adidas v. NCAA, 40 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1283 (D. Kan. 1999).
131. Id. at 1285.
132. Press Release, NCAA Guidelines, supra note 4.
133. Id.
134. Adidas, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 1286.
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a plaintiff would likely argue that the regulation affects competition by forcing
universities to either abstain from NCAA-sponsored post-season play or
change the way in which they market their program.
If a court were to conclude that the NCAA's mascot ban is subject to
antitrust law, then the court would proceed to consider whether the act violates
section one of the Sherman Act. As previously discussed, a violation of
section one of the Sherman Act has two prima facie elements: 1) A contract,
combination or conspiracy - some form of an agreement, 2) In unreasonable
restraint of trade. 35 Furthermore, a court would probably follow Board of
Regents and apply the rule of reason, because the NCAA is an organization
that requires some form of cooperation in order for the product to be in
existence at all.
36
B. Is There a Contract, Combination or Conspiracy - Some Form of an
Agreement?
Petitioner must first show some type of agreement. However, this element
will be easy to demonstrate because the Supreme Court has already answered
this question. In NCAA v. Board of Regents, the Supreme Court stated that the
NCAA member institutions created "an agreement among competitors on the
way in which they will compete with one another."'3 7 Therefore, this first
element has already been decided. The real obstacle that any petitioner will
face will be demonstrating the second prima facie element, that the NCAA's
regulation is an unreasonable restraint of trade. This second prima facie
element can best be examined by first analyzing whether the regulation
restrains trade and then analyzing whether the restraint is unreasonable.
C. Is There a Restraint of Trade?
In order to demonstrate the second prima facie element, a petitioner must
show that the NCAA regulation restrains trade. One example of this is that the
NCAA regulation forces teams to choose between one of three options: 1)
Change those symbols, images, and mascots, including team names; 2)
Remove or cover those symbols when competing in and/or hosting NCAA
championship events, or 3) Do not compete in or host NCAA championship
events. 3 Forcing a team to choose among these three options restrains the
team from operating as it otherwise would but for the regulation.
135. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
136. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984).
137. Id. at 99.




In order to be successful, a petitioner will also want to argue that the
regulation restrains trade because it affects price and output. While this
regulation does not directly or explicitly limit price or output, it arguably has
this indirect effect. A petitioner could argue that if a targeted university
chooses to comply with the regulation by opting to not compete in NCAA
championship events, then output has been affected because the team will
compete in one less game that season. Accordingly, under classic economics
principles, as output is decreased, price will therefore increase. The price of
a ticket for the team's remaining games will then increase because supply
would decrease. While the regulation does not seek to regulate output or price
on its face, one can see how it could clearly affect both in a way that
competition is worse off.
The regulation is effectively an ultimatum, forcing NCAA members to
make a decision that those members would not normally make. It restrains
members from making independent decisions regarding the symbols and
imagery that represent the universities. These aspects are inextricably linked
with a university's ability to market itself. The NCAA could argue that the
effect upon the university's marketing ability is de minimis; a university is
only prevented from displaying mascots and imagery at post-season play, is
free to display the imagery at all other games, and is not restrained from
marketing the merchandise that displays such imagery. The problem with this
argument is that it is defeated by reality. If university mascots and images are
so unimportant, then why do universities go to such great lengths to present
unique and memorable mascots at sporting events? The University of Illinois,
a school currently subject to the NCAA's regulation, played in the NCAA
Men's Basketball Championship game in 2005. If this regulation had been in
place last year during the 2005 NCAA Basketball Tournament, the University
of Illinois would have been prohibited from displaying its mascot or other
related imagery at any of the tournament games, including the nationally
televised National Championship game against the University of North
Carolina.39
The regulation has varying impacts upon each of the schools. While the
University of Illinois is now prevented from displaying its eighty-year-old
mascot, Chief Illiniwek, at NCAA sponsored post-season games, other
targeted universities have been, or will be, affected differently. In order to
comply with the NCAA regulation, Midwestern State University agreed to
139. Rick Telander, Orange Surprisingly Still Perfect Color, CHICAGO SUN TIMEs, Jan. 6,
2006, at 111.
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remove the name 'Indians' from its basketball court.' 40 The point of emphasis
here is that those schools subject to the regulation will be forced to change
their behavior in some form, whether it be the way a school markets its
product, or the games in which it chooses to participate. This fact
demonstrates that the regulation restrains trade.
D. Is the Restraint of Trade Unreasonable?
In Board of Regents, the Supreme Court applied the rule of reason because
college football is an "industry in which horizontal restraints on competition
are essential if the product is to be available at all.' 4' The practical effect of
applying the rule of reason is that the plaintiff will bear the burden of
demonstrating that the regulation is one that unreasonably restrains trade.
42
In order to determine whether this NCAA regulation is unreasonable, one must
look to Board ofRegents and the line of cases that follow.
The Court in Board of Regents found the NCAA's conduct, a television
licensing agreement, to be an unreasonable restraint of trade. 43 The Supreme
Court particularly emphasized that the television licensing agreement had anti-
competitive consequences: it reduced output, increased price, and was
unresponsive to consumer demand.' 44 The Court also noted that the restraint
had no pro-competitive justifications and was not necessary in order to market
the product. 1
45
A petitioner seeking to challenge the NCAA regulation at issue will want
to make the same previously made arguments that the regulation affects price
and output. Just as importantly, the petitioner could point out that the
regulation is not responsive to consumer preferences because it forces
universities to choose between championship play and continuing century-old
traditions. No evidence indicates that a majority of consumers, or even a
substantial minority of consumers, favor this regulation. Of course, this
analysis depends entirely upon how one defines the class of consumers for
college football; however, even a favorable definition of the group suggests
that consumers do not oppose the use of Native American mascots or imagery
140. Press Release, NCAA, Statement by NCAA Senior Vice-President for Government and
Membership Bernard Franklin on Carthage College and Midwestern State University (Nov. 9,
2005), available at http://www2.ncaa.org/media and events/press-room/2005/november/2005
1109 carthage_midwestern_stmt.html.
141. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984).
142. See Banks v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 850, 858 n.7 (N.D. Ind. 1990).
143. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 99-100.
144. Id. at 107.




in college athletics. "In 2002 Sports Illustrated published a poll of 351 Native
Americans, 217 living on reservations, 134 living off. Eighty-one percent said
high school and college teams should not stop using Indian nicknames." '146
A petitioner will also want to argue that the NCAA mascot ban, like the
television licensing agreement in Board of Regents, does not "fit into the same
mold as do rules defining the conditions of the contest, the eligibility of
participants, or the manner in which members of a joint enterprise shall share
the responsibilities and the benefits of the total venture.' 47 While organized
competition requires rules defining the condition of the contest, who may play
and who may not, and how the costs of the agreement will be borne, it is not
necessary for the existence of the endeavor to regulate the names of athletic
teams and how a program chooses to market its team.
IV. Conclusion
A reading of Supreme Court cases dealing with section one of the Sherman
Act presents the same familiar tests for whether the conduct is unreasonable
and therefore illegal. The cases consistently apply the same questions for
analysis. Is the regulation responsive to consumer preferences? Is there a pro-
competitive justification for the restraint of trade? Are price and output
unaffected by the regulation? Applying these questions to the regulation at
issue presents the consistent answer to each: "No." Nevertheless, these typical
questions are not as relevant to the NCAA mascot ban because, as Banks,
Gaines, and Adidas all demonstrate, courts have given deference to the
NCAA's implementation of the rules necessary for the organization.
Following Adidas, a court reviewing the NCAA mascot ban will first
consider whether the regulation is even subject to antitrust laws at all. A court
could very well determine that the regulation is not subject to antitrust law.
The regulation does not appear commercial on its face -- it appears to regulate
appropriate names and imagery for membership schools. Nevertheless, there
are certainly good arguments that the regulation should be the subject of
antitrust law. The regulation will restrain trade by prohibiting teams from
using century-old mascots, logos, and nicknames in post-season play. The
regulation certainly could affect output; if schools chose to not change their
mascot or school name then they will be required to abstain from NCAA
sponsored championships. This will result in fewer games played by that team
146. George F. Will, Editorial, ChiefAmong the Silliness, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 5,2006,
atA15.
147. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984).
No. I1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
for the particular year. Furthermore, the regulation will certainly affect the,
way some institutions market their program. In addition, the regulation is
arguably unresponsive to consumer preferences; consumers may prefer that
their team maintain its name and school history.
Even if a court were to decide that this regulation is the subject of antitrust
law, it would still likely find that the regulation does not violate section one
because it is a reasonable restraint. It seems that the regulation is neither
procompetitive nor anticompetitive, but unconcerned with competition
altogether. An NCAA press statement contends that the regulation serves the
core values of the NCAA's constitution pertaining to cultural diversity, ethical
sportsmanship and nondiscrimination.'48 These seem like ethical justifications
unrelated to competition. While there may be an incidental effect on
competition, it seems impossible to determine whether this effect will be
procompetitive or anticompetitive. Most importantly, an organization must be
given some latitude to maintain its brand integrity by regulating how it is
represented. The purpose of the NCAA regulation is unrelated to competition,
but it will certainly have incidental effects on competition. Despite the
regulation's possible indirect impact on output and the way a school markets
itself, the courts should look past these incidental effects and allow the NCAA
room to regulate a culturally sensitive area.
148. See Press Release, NCAA Guidelines, supra note 4.
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